Figure 1 US 155 mm output, March 2026, and stock drawdown since 2022 (US Department of War Inspector General); Russian artillery ammunition output, 2025 (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service assessment).
36,000US 155 mm rounds a month, goal 100,000
7.0mRussian artillery rounds, 2025
−3.6mUS 155 mm stocks in four years
01Latest · updated 19 November 2026
Contracts in billions. Shells in thousands.
Ceilings A multi-year ceiling is the most the government may spend, not money committed. US contract records lag about 90 days, so awards after August come from company releases. The year’s largest US munitions deals are ceilings: PAC-3 up to $53.9bn, THAAD $35bn, SM-6 $24.4bn and AMRAAM $20.7bn. By August only $0.8bn had been obligated on THAAD and nothing on the PAC-3 ceiling.
The latest record
| Date | Country | Event | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17 Nov 2026 | Israel | Elbit reports $33.0bn consolidated order backlog at 30 September 2026, versus $25.2bn a year earlier (×1.31). | Company results; group backlog, not domain orders or deliveries |
| 11 Nov 2026 | European Union · Ukraine | First €184.5m USI-IRA call received 58 proposals at its 10 November close. | Applications; not awards or deliveries |
| 10 Nov 2026 | United States | Lockheed delivers its 100,000th GMLRS rocket. | Builder release |
| 5 Nov 2026 | Germany | Rheinmetall reports delays in acceptance of artillery shell batches and cuts its ammunition sales guidance to €4.4–4.5bn. | Company filing |
| 3 Nov 2026 | Spain | €269m framework for extended-range 155 mm shells. | Council of Ministers |
| 1 Oct 2026 | United States | SM-6 multi-year deal, up to $24.4bn. | Ceiling, company release |
| 24 Sep 2026 | United Kingdom | MOD reports roughly £79m lower year-on-year FY2025–26 payments for production under its long-term BAE munitions contract. | Expenditure statistics; not output or orders |
| 11 Sep 2026 | Poland | First Piorun contract, about PLN 3bn, under a framework of over PLN 8bn. | MoD outlet |
| 8 Sep 2026 | United Kingdom | Millionth artillery round delivered to Ukraine. | Ministry release |
| 29 Jul 2026 | United States | PAC-3 MSE seven-year deal: up to $53.9bn, $0 obligated so far. | Contract record |
| 9 Jul 2026 | United States | Inspector General: 155 mm output 36,000 a month; the 100,000 goal was missed. | Audit report |
| 30 May 2026 | Poland | Several hundred thousand 155 mm rounds ordered for over PLN 13.5bn. | MoD outlet |
Grade C Company-reported backlog in each firm’s own currency. Lockheed’s jump is mostly the PAC-3 ceiling. Elbit is consolidated group backlog, not munitions-only backlog. LIG Nex1 is compared over nine months, to June 2026. Missile backlogs are rising fastest. Rheinmetall’s ammunition backlog grew 10%, but its firm orders rose 31% while framework volumes fell.
Elbit’s consolidated backlog was $32.0bn at Q2 2026. The updated comparison uses $25.2bn at 30 September 2025 and $33.0bn at 30 September 2026; these group figures are not drone- or munitions-specific orders, sales, expenditure or deliveries.
02Executive summary
Executive summary
How this report is made. AI helps gather official sources and draft the charts. Every figure was read on a ministry, auditor, parliament or manufacturer page, or is labelled as a state claim, a belligerent claim or another government’s assessment. — Alessandro L. Piana Bianco. Sources & methods Since 2022 governments have ordered shells, rockets and interceptors in quantities not seen in decades. This report asks whether those orders become munitions, how fast new plants open, and whether output keeps up with what wars consume.
- Ceilings, not cash. The four largest US missile deals of the year are multi-year ceilings worth up to $134bn. The largest, $53.9bn for PAC-3, had no money obligated by August.$0obligated on the PAC-3 ceiling
- Missile makers hold the money. Lockheed’s missiles division holds $142.5bn of backlog, three times a year earlier; MBDA €44.4bn; Rheinmetall’s ammunition business €25.6bn.×3.1Lockheed missiles backlog
- Shell output trails every target. US 155 mm output was 36,000 a month in March 2026, against a goal of 100,000 by October 2025. France reached 3,000 a month against 4,000–5,000. Europe’s 2 million a year is claimed only orally.36%of the US monthly goal
- Stocks are falling, and secret. US 155 mm stocks fell by more than 3.6 million rounds in four years: 8.3 years of current output. Every other country classifies its stocks.8.3 yrsof US output to refill
- New plants open late. The US metal-parts modernisation is 11 months late and its newest plant has made no usable parts. Rheinmetall’s 1.5 million-shell milestone moved from 2027 to 2030; the Aster 30 B1NT from 2024 to 2027.≥ 5 yrsto replace US interceptors
- Wars consume faster than factories make. On Estonia’s assessment Russia made 7.0 million artillery rounds in 2025 and fires 10,000–15,000 a day, with 5–7 million more imported from Iran and North Korea since 2023.7.0mRussian rounds, 2025
Capacity is what a plant could make; output is what it made. Most governments publish the first and classify the second, and every country but the US classifies its stocks. Figures are compared within a country over time, not added up across countries.
03The order book
Missile makers hold the money.
Conversion ECB reference rates, 13 November 2026. Munitions-led businesses only: RTX ($164bn of defence backlog) and Elbit ($33.0bn) report group figures and are kept out. Nammo’s order reserve, NOK 55.0bn, and LIG Nex1’s KRW 24.6tn are not converted. Lockheed’s missiles division holds more than the next three munitions businesses combined, though most of it is a ceiling not yet funded.
Requests, not orders FY2027 quantities requested by the Department of War, as reported by the Congressional Research Service; FY2026 is the enacted base plus supplemental. The US asks for interceptors on a new scale: thirteen times as many PAC-3 MSE and twenty-three times as many THAAD as in FY2026.
Data
| Munition | FY2026 | FY2027 request |
|---|---|---|
| PAC-3 MSE | 245 | 3,203 |
| THAAD | 37 | 857 |
| Javelin | 705 | 1,509 |
| SM-6 | 139 | 540 |
Europe orders in money, not quantities. Poland ordered several hundred thousand 155 mm rounds for over PLN 13.5bn and Piorun missiles under a PLN 8bn framework. Spain authorised €351m of 155 mm frameworks; Italy sent Parliament €2.3bn for SAMP/T NG and Aster. The UK budgets £11.1bn for weapons and munitions over four years.
04Output
Shell output trails every target.
DOWIG-2026-095 US Department of War Inspector General, 9 July 2026. Finished rounds are limited by loading and packing; metal parts reached 46,000 a month. The Mesquite plant, $469m, had made no parts that met specification. US 155 mm output rose from 14,000 a month before the war to a peak of 40,000 in 2024, then fell back to 36,000 in March 2026: 36% of the goal set for October 2025.
Capacity is not output Rheinmetall’s figures are planned capacity. The European Commission said capacity reached 1 million a year in January 2024; the 2 million for end-2025 was confirmed only in a Commissioner’s speech. Europe publishes capacity, rarely output. Rheinmetall plans 1.1 million shells a year by 2027 and 1.5 million by 2030; its new Unterlüß plant was scheduled to deliver 140,000 in 2026, against 350,000 of capacity.
Missiles scale from small bases. Lockheed made 620 PAC-3 MSE in 2025 and aims for 2,000 a year by 2030; THAAD runs at 96 a year with a target of 400. GMLRS is near 14,000 rockets a year.
Data
| Missile | Current a year | Target a year |
|---|---|---|
| PAC-3 MSE | 620 | 2,000 (2030) |
| THAAD | 96 | 400 |
| Javelin | 2,400 | 3,960 (late 2026) |
05Stocks
Stocks are falling, and secret.
The only official drawdown US Department of War Inspector General, July 2026. Over 3 million rounds went to Ukraine through presidential drawdown; the rest to foreign military sales and training. Only the US has published how far its shell stocks fell: by more than 3.6 million rounds in four years, 8.3 years of current output. No country publishes its stock level.
Elsewhere stocks appear only as assessments. Estonia puts Russia’s pre-war stockpile at up to 20 million rounds. Japan’s white paper reports that Iran’s ballistic missiles fell to 1,000–1,500 after June 2025 and were rebuilt to about 2,000. Israel says only that its interceptor stocks “continue to grow”.
06Build time
New plants open late.
Replacement The Congressional Budget Office, as quoted by CRS, estimates that replacing the interceptors the US used against Iran will take at least five years. Ramp-ups slip by months at the factory and years at the milestone. Poland’s new charge plant opens at the earliest at end-2027; the extra US metal-parts sources are not expected before December 2028.
07Consumption
Wars consume faster than factories make.
Estonian assessment Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, February 2026: artillery ammunition of 100 mm and above, including tank, mortar and rocket rounds. Grade A: one government’s assessment of another. Russia’s output rose seventeenfold in four years, to 7.0 million rounds in 2025. It fires 10,000–15,000 a day, 3.7–5.5 million a year, and has imported 5–7 million more from Iran and North Korea since 2023.
Labels EU: European External Action Service. UK: Ministry of Defence. US: Inspector General. Ukraine: government statements (state claims), 2024 output and 2025 deliveries from partners. Ukraine’s supply comes from many sources, none of them matching Russia’s output alone.
Interceptors run out fastest. CRS puts the munitions the US spent in the Iran war at $22.3bn to 29 June 2026; one carrier group fired 155 Standard missiles in the Red Sea in 2023–24. Japan’s white paper counts more than 550 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones fired by Iran at Israel in June 2025.
08Rivals
Russia out-produces Europe, with help.
Not like for like Russia: all artillery ammunition, Estonian assessment. EU: claimed annual capacity, oral. US: actual 155 mm output at the March 2026 rate. Poland: target from 2028. Russia’s 2025 output alone is more than three times Europe’s claimed capacity and sixteen times US 155 mm output. Moscow plans 21 million munitions of all types in 2026.
North Korea fills the gap. South Korea’s intelligence service counted over 13,000 containers and over 8 million shells sent to Russia by October 2024; an eleven-government monitoring team counts up to 9 million rounds in 2024 alone, and at least 100 ballistic missiles. China publishes nothing on munitions.
09What is published
Capacity is published. Stocks are not.
Score Out of eight measures filled at least in part: stocks, output, orders, backlog, capacity plans, slip, use or supply, budget. The US publishes the most, through its auditors and contract records. European governments publish budgets and capacity, rarely output. China publishes nothing; Russia’s figures come from Estonia and Japan.
Data
| Country | Stocks | Output | Orders | Backlog | Capacity | Slip | Use or supply | Budget | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | partial | official | official | official | official | official | official | official | 8/8 |
| France | MISSING | official | partial | partial | official | official | MISSING | official | 6/8 |
| Germany | MISSING | partial | official | official | official | official | MISSING | official | 6/8 |
| United Kingdom | MISSING | MISSING | partial | MISSING | official | MISSING | official | official | 4/8 |
| Norway | MISSING | partial | partial | partial | official | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | 4/8 |
| Sweden | MISSING | MISSING | official | official | partial | MISSING | partial | MISSING | 4/8 |
| Poland | MISSING | partial | official | MISSING | official | official | MISSING | MISSING | 4/8 |
| Israel | partial | MISSING | official | partial | MISSING | MISSING | partial | MISSING | 4/8 |
| Japan | MISSING | MISSING | official | MISSING | partial | official | MISSING | official | 4/8 |
| Russia | partial | partial | MISSING | MISSING | partial | MISSING | partial | MISSING | 4/8 |
| South Korea | MISSING | MISSING | official | official | MISSING | partial | MISSING | MISSING | 3/8 |
| Ukraine | MISSING | partial | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | partial | official | 3/8 |
| Italy | MISSING | MISSING | official | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | official | 2/8 |
| Netherlands | MISSING | MISSING | partial | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | official | 2/8 |
| Iran | partial | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | partial | MISSING | 2/8 |
| Spain | MISSING | MISSING | official | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | 1/8 |
| Finland | MISSING | MISSING | partial | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | 1/8 |
| China | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | MISSING | 0/8 |
10What to watch next
Count rounds delivered, not ceilings.
The order surge is real. Whether it becomes endurance depends on metal parts, powder and plants opening on time.
- US 155 mm. Whether output passes 40,000 a month and the Mesquite plant makes usable parts.
- Ceilings. How much of the PAC-3, THAAD, SM-6 and AMRAAM ceilings is actually obligated in FY2027.
- Rheinmetall. Whether artillery shell batches pass acceptance and Unterlüß delivers its 140,000.
- Europe’s 2 million. A written, audited figure for EU output, not an oral claim.
- Russia. Whether the 21 million munitions planned for 2026 appear, and how much still comes from North Korea.
Contracts measure intent.
Rounds delivered measure endurance.
Sources & methods
Official data only.
Evidence rules. A figure counts only if it was read on an official page or PDF (ministry, armed forces, procurement agency, auditor, parliament, European Commission) or in the manufacturer’s own release or regulated filing. News and search snippets are excluded. MISSING means no official figure could be read; it never means zero. Russian, Chinese and Iranian statements are labelled state claims; Ukraine’s production figures are government statements. Estonian, South Korean and Japanese assessments of other countries are labelled as such. Sites that refused automated access were not worked around.
Main sources. US: Department of War Inspector General, CRS, USAspending (FPDS), Army; Lockheed Martin, RTX, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman filings. EU: European Commission, EEAS, EPRS. France: Assemblée nationale and Senate reports, DGA; KNDS, MBDA. UK: Defence Investment Plan, Ministry of Defence, Health and Safety Executive. Germany: federal budget; Rheinmetall, Diehl. Italy: Camera dei deputati. Spain: La Moncloa. Netherlands: Defensie Projectenoverzicht. Norway: Forsvarsmateriell; Nammo. Sweden: Saab. Poland: Polska Zbrojna (MoD). Israel: Ministry of Defense; Elbit. Ukraine: government portal. Japan: budgets and Defense white paper. South Korea: DART filings (LIG Nex1, Hanwha Aerospace, Poongsan), korea.kr. Russia: Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service yearbook; Ministry of Defence and Rostec via TASS. North Korea: South Korea’s National Intelligence Service; Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team.
Blocked. cbo.gov, media.defense.gov, dodig.mil, navy.mil, dsca.mil, asafm.army.mil, the Lockheed and RTX investor sites, investors.baesystems.com, parliament.uk, difesa.it, regjeringen.no, president.gov.ua, the Finnish government sites, gov.pl, idf.il, mofa.go.jp PDFs, mod.go.jp pages, dapa.go.kr, mil.ru and rostec.ru. Figures that depend on them are MISSING.
Exchange rates. ECB reference rates, 13 November 2026: EUR 1.1052, SEK 0.0995 USD.
Cite this report
Alessandro L. Piana Bianco. Factories are expanding. Shells still run short.. in/out. First published . Last recorded update: .
Canonical URL: https://pianabianco.com/inout/munitions/
Disclaimer
This report was produced with the help of AI. AI agents were used to gather, cluster and integrate the data and to generate the charts and graphs. Further analysis, editorial judgement and conclusions are the author’s.
All data from publicly available sources.
All opinions expressed in this report are solely my own and do not represent the views of any current or former employer.