Factories are expanding. Shells still run short.

Eighteen countries, one question: is the surge in munitions orders turning into shells and missiles faster than wars use them? Official data only. Where a figure is not published, the gap is shown, not filled.

Munitions. Alessandro L. Piana Bianco — updated , 9 min read. The Latest section is updated as new evidence warrants.

Figure 1 US 155 mm output, March 2026, and stock drawdown since 2022 (US Department of War Inspector General); Russian artillery ammunition output, 2025 (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service assessment).

01Latest · updated 19 November 2026

Contracts in billions. Shells in thousands.

Ceilings A multi-year ceiling is the most the government may spend, not money committed. US contract records lag about 90 days, so awards after August come from company releases. The year’s largest US munitions deals are ceilings: PAC-3 up to $53.9bn, THAAD $35bn, SM-6 $24.4bn and AMRAAM $20.7bn. By August only $0.8bn had been obligated on THAAD and nothing on the PAC-3 ceiling.

The latest record

DateCountryEventStatus
17 Nov 2026IsraelElbit reports $33.0bn consolidated order backlog at 30 September 2026, versus $25.2bn a year earlier (×1.31).Company results; group backlog, not domain orders or deliveries
11 Nov 2026European Union · UkraineFirst €184.5m USI-IRA call received 58 proposals at its 10 November close.Applications; not awards or deliveries
10 Nov 2026United StatesLockheed delivers its 100,000th GMLRS rocket.Builder release
5 Nov 2026GermanyRheinmetall reports delays in acceptance of artillery shell batches and cuts its ammunition sales guidance to €4.4–4.5bn.Company filing
3 Nov 2026Spain€269m framework for extended-range 155 mm shells.Council of Ministers
1 Oct 2026United StatesSM-6 multi-year deal, up to $24.4bn.Ceiling, company release
24 Sep 2026United KingdomMOD reports roughly £79m lower year-on-year FY2025–26 payments for production under its long-term BAE munitions contract.Expenditure statistics; not output or orders
11 Sep 2026PolandFirst Piorun contract, about PLN 3bn, under a framework of over PLN 8bn.MoD outlet
8 Sep 2026United KingdomMillionth artillery round delivered to Ukraine.Ministry release
29 Jul 2026United StatesPAC-3 MSE seven-year deal: up to $53.9bn, $0 obligated so far.Contract record
9 Jul 2026United StatesInspector General: 155 mm output 36,000 a month; the 100,000 goal was missed.Audit report
30 May 2026PolandSeveral hundred thousand 155 mm rounds ordered for over PLN 13.5bn.MoD outlet

Grade C Company-reported backlog in each firm’s own currency. Lockheed’s jump is mostly the PAC-3 ceiling. Elbit is consolidated group backlog, not munitions-only backlog. LIG Nex1 is compared over nine months, to June 2026. Missile backlogs are rising fastest. Rheinmetall’s ammunition backlog grew 10%, but its firm orders rose 31% while framework volumes fell.

0×3.2Lockheed MissilesLockheed Missiles: ×3.10×3.10RTX defenceRTX defence: ×1.59×1.59Elbit (group)Elbit (group): ×1.31×1.31Rheinmetall AmmoRheinmetall Ammo: ×1.10×1.10Saab DynamicsSaab Dynamics: ×1.06×1.06LIG Nex1LIG Nex1: ×1.05×1.05
Missile backlogs lead the growth. Change in reported backlog, Q3 2025 → Q3 2026; LIG Nex1, Q3 2025 → Q2 2026.
Data
BusinessChangeFromTo
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control×3.10$45.9bn$142.5bn
RTX, defence (all)×1.59$103bn$164bn
Elbit Systems (group)×1.31$25.2bn$33.0bn
Rheinmetall Weapon and Ammunition×1.10€23.2bn€25.6bn
Saab Dynamics×1.06SEK 87.7bnSEK 93.1bn
LIG Nex1×1.05KRW 23.4tnKRW 24.6tn

Elbit’s consolidated backlog was $32.0bn at Q2 2026. The updated comparison uses $25.2bn at 30 September 2025 and $33.0bn at 30 September 2026; these group figures are not drone- or munitions-specific orders, sales, expenditure or deliveries.

02Executive summary

Executive summary

How this report is made. AI helps gather official sources and draft the charts. Every figure was read on a ministry, auditor, parliament or manufacturer page, or is labelled as a state claim, a belligerent claim or another government’s assessment. — Alessandro L. Piana Bianco. Sources & methods Since 2022 governments have ordered shells, rockets and interceptors in quantities not seen in decades. This report asks whether those orders become munitions, how fast new plants open, and whether output keeps up with what wars consume.

  1. Ceilings, not cash. The four largest US missile deals of the year are multi-year ceilings worth up to $134bn. The largest, $53.9bn for PAC-3, had no money obligated by August.$0obligated on the PAC-3 ceiling
  2. Missile makers hold the money. Lockheed’s missiles division holds $142.5bn of backlog, three times a year earlier; MBDA €44.4bn; Rheinmetall’s ammunition business €25.6bn.×3.1Lockheed missiles backlog
  3. Shell output trails every target. US 155 mm output was 36,000 a month in March 2026, against a goal of 100,000 by October 2025. France reached 3,000 a month against 4,000–5,000. Europe’s 2 million a year is claimed only orally.36%of the US monthly goal
  4. Stocks are falling, and secret. US 155 mm stocks fell by more than 3.6 million rounds in four years: 8.3 years of current output. Every other country classifies its stocks.8.3 yrsof US output to refill
  5. New plants open late. The US metal-parts modernisation is 11 months late and its newest plant has made no usable parts. Rheinmetall’s 1.5 million-shell milestone moved from 2027 to 2030; the Aster 30 B1NT from 2024 to 2027.≥ 5 yrsto replace US interceptors
  6. Wars consume faster than factories make. On Estonia’s assessment Russia made 7.0 million artillery rounds in 2025 and fires 10,000–15,000 a day, with 5–7 million more imported from Iran and North Korea since 2023.7.0mRussian rounds, 2025

Capacity is what a plant could make; output is what it made. Most governments publish the first and classify the second, and every country but the US classifies its stocks. Figures are compared within a country over time, not added up across countries.

03The order book

Missile makers hold the money.

Conversion ECB reference rates, 13 November 2026. Munitions-led businesses only: RTX ($164bn of defence backlog) and Elbit ($33.0bn) report group figures and are kept out. Nammo’s order reserve, NOK 55.0bn, and LIG Nex1’s KRW 24.6tn are not converted. Lockheed’s missiles division holds more than the next three munitions businesses combined, though most of it is a ceiling not yet funded.

0$150bnLockheed MissilesLockheed Missiles: $142.5bn$142.5bnMBDAMBDA: $49.1bn$49.1bnRheinmetall AmmoRheinmetall Ammo: $28.2bn$28.2bnSaab DynamicsSaab Dynamics: $9.3bn$9.3bn
Munitions backlog. USD bn. Lockheed Missiles and Fire Control, Rheinmetall Weapon and Ammunition and Saab Dynamics at Q3 2026; MBDA at end-2025.
Data
BusinessBacklog, $bnReported
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control142.5$142.5bn, Sep 2026
MBDA49.1€44.4bn, Dec 2025
Rheinmetall Weapon and Ammunition28.2€25.6bn, Sep 2026
Saab Dynamics9.3SEK 93.1bn, Sep 2026

Requests, not orders FY2027 quantities requested by the Department of War, as reported by the Congressional Research Service; FY2026 is the enacted base plus supplemental. The US asks for interceptors on a new scale: thirteen times as many PAC-3 MSE and twenty-three times as many THAAD as in FY2026.

0100020003000FY2026FY2027 requestSM-6SM-6 FY2026 139SM-6 FY2027 request 540×3.9JavelinJavelin FY2026 705Javelin FY2027 request 1509×2.1THAADTHAAD FY2026 37THAAD FY2027 request 857×23PAC-3 MSEPAC-3 MSE FY2026 245PAC-3 MSE FY2027 request 3203×13
US munitions bought, FY2026 against the FY2027 request. Missiles. Congressional Research Service, February and September 2026. The FY2027 request totals $95bn for missiles and munitions.
Data
MunitionFY2026FY2027 request
PAC-3 MSE2453,203
THAAD37857
Javelin7051,509
SM-6139540

Europe orders in money, not quantities. Poland ordered several hundred thousand 155 mm rounds for over PLN 13.5bn and Piorun missiles under a PLN 8bn framework. Spain authorised €351m of 155 mm frameworks; Italy sent Parliament €2.3bn for SAMP/T NG and Aster. The UK budgets £11.1bn for weapons and munitions over four years.

04Output

Shell output trails every target.

DOWIG-2026-095 US Department of War Inspector General, 9 July 2026. Finished rounds are limited by loading and packing; metal parts reached 46,000 a month. The Mesquite plant, $469m, had made no parts that met specification. US 155 mm output rose from 14,000 a month before the war to a peak of 40,000 in 2024, then fell back to 36,000 in March 2026: 36% of the goal set for October 2025.

0100kFeb 2022Feb 2022: 14k14kNov 2023Nov 2023: 28k28kFeb 2024Feb 2024: 30k30kSep 2024Sep 2024: 40k40kMar 2026Mar 2026: 36k36kGoal, Oct 2025Goal, Oct 2025: 100k100k
US 155 mm shells per month. Thousand rounds. Army and Department of War statements, Inspector General (March 2026). Grey: the National Defense Industrial Strategy goal, missed.
Data
DateRounds a monthSource
Feb 202214,000Inspector General
Nov 202328,000Army
Feb 202430,000Army
Sep 202440,000DoD via CRS
Mar 202636,000Inspector General
Goal, 1 Oct 2025100,000missed

Capacity is not output Rheinmetall’s figures are planned capacity. The European Commission said capacity reached 1 million a year in January 2024; the 2 million for end-2025 was confirmed only in a Commissioner’s speech. Europe publishes capacity, rarely output. Rheinmetall plans 1.1 million shells a year by 2027 and 1.5 million by 2030; its new Unterlüß plant was scheduled to deliver 140,000 in 2026, against 350,000 of capacity.

RheinmetallRheinmetall 2022: 70702022Rheinmetall 2027: 1,1001,1002027Rheinmetall 2030: 1,5001,5002030EUEU 2022: 3003002022EU 2024: 1,0001,0002024EU 2025: 2,0002,0002025
European 155 mm capacity. Thousand shells a year, same scale. Rheinmetall: 2022 actual, 2027 and 2030 plan. EU: 2022 and January 2024 per the Commission; 2025 (red) is the target, claimed reached only orally.
Data
YearRheinmetall capacityEU capacity
202270,000≈ 300,000
2024—1,000,000
2025700,000 (plan)2,000,000 (target; oral claim)
2027≈ 1,100,000 (plan)—
2030≈ 1,500,000 (plan)—

Missiles scale from small bases. Lockheed made 620 PAC-3 MSE in 2025 and aims for 2,000 a year by 2030; THAAD runs at 96 a year with a target of 400. GMLRS is near 14,000 rockets a year.

01000200030004000current ratetargetJavelinJavelin current rate 2400Javelin target 3960×1.7THAADTHAAD current rate 96THAAD target 400×4.2PAC-3 MSEPAC-3 MSE current rate 620PAC-3 MSE target 2000×3.2
US missile production, current rate against target. Missiles a year, company-reported. PAC-3 MSE: 620 in 2025, 2,000 by end-2030. THAAD: 96, 400 under the seven-year framework. Javelin: 2,400, 3,960 by late 2026.
Data
MissileCurrent a yearTarget a year
PAC-3 MSE6202,000 (2030)
THAAD96400
Javelin2,4003,960 (late 2026)

05Stocks

Stocks are falling, and secret.

The only official drawdown US Department of War Inspector General, July 2026. Over 3 million rounds went to Ukraine through presidential drawdown; the rest to foreign military sales and training. Only the US has published how far its shell stocks fell: by more than 3.6 million rounds in four years, 8.3 years of current output. No country publishes its stock level.

03.2mTo UkraineTo Ukraine: > 3.0m> 3.0mForeign salesForeign sales: 0.22m0.22mTrainingTraining: 0.11m0.11mOutput, a yearOutput, a year: 0.43m0.43m
US 155 mm rounds out of stock, 2022–2026, against a year of output. Million rounds. Inspector General. Output: 36,000 a month in March 2026.
Data
UseRounds
Presidential drawdown to Ukraine> 3,000,000
Foreign military sales≈ 217,857
Training and testing≈ 111,637
Output, one year at March 2026 rate432,000

Elsewhere stocks appear only as assessments. Estonia puts Russia’s pre-war stockpile at up to 20 million rounds. Japan’s white paper reports that Iran’s ballistic missiles fell to 1,000–1,500 after June 2025 and were rebuilt to about 2,000. Israel says only that its interceptor stocks “continue to grow”.

06Build time

New plants open late.

Replacement The Congressional Budget Office, as quoted by CRS, estimates that replacing the interceptors the US used against Iran will take at least five years. Ramp-ups slip by months at the factory and years at the milestone. Poland’s new charge plant opens at the earliest at end-2027; the extra US metal-parts sources are not expected before December 2028.

048 moJapan, JSMJapan, JSM: ≈ 48 mo≈ 48 moRheinmetall, 1.5mRheinmetall, 1.5m: ≈ 36 mo≈ 36 moAster 30 B1NTAster 30 B1NT: ≈ 36 mo≈ 36 moUS metal partsUS metal parts: 11 mo11 moKorea, Cheongung IIKorea, Cheongung II: 7 mo7 moJapan, Type 25 SSMJapan, Type 25 SSM: on timeon time
Official slip against plan. Months. Japan MoD (JSM FY2021 → FY2025; Type 25 deployed March 2026 as planned), Rheinmetall (2027 → 2030), Assemblée nationale (Aster B1NT 2024 → 2027), US Inspector General (metal parts), LIG Nex1 filing (Cheongung II second lot).
Data
ProgrammeSlip
Japan, JSM≈ 48 mo
Rheinmetall, 1.5m≈ 36 mo
Aster 30 B1NT≈ 36 mo
US metal parts11 mo
Korea, Cheongung II7 mo
Japan, Type 25 SSMon time

07Consumption

Wars consume faster than factories make.

Estonian assessment Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, February 2026: artillery ammunition of 100 mm and above, including tank, mortar and rocket rounds. Grade A: one government’s assessment of another. Russia’s output rose seventeenfold in four years, to 7.0 million rounds in 2025. It fires 10,000–15,000 a day, 3.7–5.5 million a year, and has imported 5–7 million more from Iran and North Korea since 2023.

07.5m20212021: 0.4m0.4m20222022: 1.0m1.0m20232023: 3.5m3.5m20242024: 4.5m4.5m20252025: 7.0m7.0mFired a yearFired a year: 3.7–5.5m3.7–5.5m
Russia: artillery ammunition made each year, and fired. Million rounds, Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service assessment. Grey: 10,000–15,000 rounds a day since 2022, a year’s worth.
Data
YearOutputNote
20210.4m
20221.0muse up to 60,000 a day in spring
20233.5mimports begin
20244.5m
20257.0m3.4m howitzer, 0.8m tank/IFV, 0.5m rocket, 2.3m mortar

Labels EU: European External Action Service. UK: Ministry of Defence. US: Inspector General. Ukraine: government statements (state claims), 2024 output and 2025 deliveries from partners. Ukraine’s supply comes from many sources, none of them matching Russia’s output alone.

03.2mUkraine’s own, 2024Ukraine’s own, 2024: ≈ 2.5m≈ 2.5mPartners, 2025Partners, 2025: > 2.4m> 2.4mEU, 2025EU, 2025: 2.0m2.0mUS, 2022–26US, 2022–26: > 3.0m> 3.0mUK, to Sep 2026UK, to Sep 2026: 1.0m1.0m
Artillery rounds for Ukraine. Million rounds, different periods: not to be added. Ukraine’s 2024 figure counts mortar and artillery rounds. The EU and partner 2025 figures overlap.
Data
SourceRoundsPeriod
Ukraine, own production≈ 2,500,0002024 (state claim)
All partners> 2,400,0002025 (state claim)
EU2,000,0002025
United States> 3,000,0002022–2026, cumulative
United Kingdom1,000,000cumulative to Sep 2026

Interceptors run out fastest. CRS puts the munitions the US spent in the Iran war at $22.3bn to 29 June 2026; one carrier group fired 155 Standard missiles in the Red Sea in 2023–24. Japan’s white paper counts more than 550 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones fired by Iran at Israel in June 2025.

08Rivals

Russia out-produces Europe, with help.

Not like for like Russia: all artillery ammunition, Estonian assessment. EU: claimed annual capacity, oral. US: actual 155 mm output at the March 2026 rate. Poland: target from 2028. Russia’s 2025 output alone is more than three times Europe’s claimed capacity and sixteen times US 155 mm output. Moscow plans 21 million munitions of all types in 2026.

07.5mRussia, 2025 outputRussia, 2025 output: 7.0m7.0mEU, claimed capacityEU, claimed capacity: 2.0m2.0mUS, 155 mm outputUS, 155 mm output: 0.43m0.43mPoland, 2028 targetPoland, 2028 target: 0.15–0.18m0.15–0.18m
Artillery rounds a year. Million. Estonian assessment (Russia), European Commission oral claim (EU), US Inspector General (US), Polish MoD outlet (Poland).
Data
ProducerRounds a yearBasis
Russia7,000,0002025 output, all artillery calibres (assessment)
EU2,000,000capacity, oral claim
United States432,000155 mm output, Mar 2026 rate
Poland150,000–180,000target from 2028

North Korea fills the gap. South Korea’s intelligence service counted over 13,000 containers and over 8 million shells sent to Russia by October 2024; an eleven-government monitoring team counts up to 9 million rounds in 2024 alone, and at least 100 ballistic missiles. China publishes nothing on munitions.

09What is published

Capacity is published. Stocks are not.

Score Out of eight measures filled at least in part: stocks, output, orders, backlog, capacity plans, slip, use or supply, budget. The US publishes the most, through its auditors and contract records. European governments publish budgets and capacity, rarely output. China publishes nothing; Russia’s figures come from Estonia and Japan.

StocksOutputOrdersBacklogCapacitySlipUse or supplyBudgetUnited States8/8France6/8Germany6/8United Kingdom4/8Norway4/8Sweden4/8Poland4/8Israel4/8Japan4/8Russia4/8South Korea3/8Ukraine3/8Italy2/8Netherlands2/8Iran2/8Spain1/8Finland1/8China0/8score
Which measures each country publishes. Black = official figure; grey = partial, company-only or another government’s assessment; ring = MISSING or unreadable. Finland’s score reflects blocked sites.
Data
CountryStocksOutputOrdersBacklogCapacitySlipUse or supplyBudgetScore
United Statespartialofficialofficialofficialofficialofficialofficialofficial8/8
FranceMISSINGofficialpartialpartialofficialofficialMISSINGofficial6/8
GermanyMISSINGpartialofficialofficialofficialofficialMISSINGofficial6/8
United KingdomMISSINGMISSINGpartialMISSINGofficialMISSINGofficialofficial4/8
NorwayMISSINGpartialpartialpartialofficialMISSINGMISSINGMISSING4/8
SwedenMISSINGMISSINGofficialofficialpartialMISSINGpartialMISSING4/8
PolandMISSINGpartialofficialMISSINGofficialofficialMISSINGMISSING4/8
IsraelpartialMISSINGofficialpartialMISSINGMISSINGpartialMISSING4/8
JapanMISSINGMISSINGofficialMISSINGpartialofficialMISSINGofficial4/8
RussiapartialpartialMISSINGMISSINGpartialMISSINGpartialMISSING4/8
South KoreaMISSINGMISSINGofficialofficialMISSINGpartialMISSINGMISSING3/8
UkraineMISSINGpartialMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGpartialofficial3/8
ItalyMISSINGMISSINGofficialMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGofficial2/8
NetherlandsMISSINGMISSINGpartialMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGofficial2/8
IranpartialMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGpartialMISSING2/8
SpainMISSINGMISSINGofficialMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSING1/8
FinlandMISSINGMISSINGpartialMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSING1/8
ChinaMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSINGMISSING0/8

Sources & methods

Official data only.

Evidence rules. A figure counts only if it was read on an official page or PDF (ministry, armed forces, procurement agency, auditor, parliament, European Commission) or in the manufacturer’s own release or regulated filing. News and search snippets are excluded. MISSING means no official figure could be read; it never means zero. Russian, Chinese and Iranian statements are labelled state claims; Ukraine’s production figures are government statements. Estonian, South Korean and Japanese assessments of other countries are labelled as such. Sites that refused automated access were not worked around.

Main sources. US: Department of War Inspector General, CRS, USAspending (FPDS), Army; Lockheed Martin, RTX, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman filings. EU: European Commission, EEAS, EPRS. France: Assemblée nationale and Senate reports, DGA; KNDS, MBDA. UK: Defence Investment Plan, Ministry of Defence, Health and Safety Executive. Germany: federal budget; Rheinmetall, Diehl. Italy: Camera dei deputati. Spain: La Moncloa. Netherlands: Defensie Projectenoverzicht. Norway: Forsvarsmateriell; Nammo. Sweden: Saab. Poland: Polska Zbrojna (MoD). Israel: Ministry of Defense; Elbit. Ukraine: government portal. Japan: budgets and Defense white paper. South Korea: DART filings (LIG Nex1, Hanwha Aerospace, Poongsan), korea.kr. Russia: Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service yearbook; Ministry of Defence and Rostec via TASS. North Korea: South Korea’s National Intelligence Service; Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team.

Blocked. cbo.gov, media.defense.gov, dodig.mil, navy.mil, dsca.mil, asafm.army.mil, the Lockheed and RTX investor sites, investors.baesystems.com, parliament.uk, difesa.it, regjeringen.no, president.gov.ua, the Finnish government sites, gov.pl, idf.il, mofa.go.jp PDFs, mod.go.jp pages, dapa.go.kr, mil.ru and rostec.ru. Figures that depend on them are MISSING.

Exchange rates. ECB reference rates, 13 November 2026: EUR 1.1052, SEK 0.0995 USD.

Cite this report

Alessandro L. Piana Bianco. Factories are expanding. Shells still run short.. in/out. First published . Last recorded update: .

Canonical URL: https://pianabianco.com/inout/munitions/

Disclaimer

This report was produced with the help of AI. AI agents were used to gather, cluster and integrate the data and to generate the charts and graphs. Further analysis, editorial judgement and conclusions are the author’s.

All data from publicly available sources.

All opinions expressed in this report are solely my own and do not represent the views of any current or former employer.